By Ray Starmann
Last week, the Navy released the results of a lengthy investigation it had completed, concerning the conduct of one officer and nine enlisted sailors after they willingly surrendered their two Riverine Patrol Craft to the Iranians and were subsequently detained for 15 hours in the Persian Gulf last January.
The Navy’s findings should have generated a media frenzy, but instead were quickly buried by the 300 foot rogue waves generated by the storm called the Hillary Clinton Email Scandal.
Here are some highlights from the investigation as reported by the Stars and Stripes:
The findings from the investigation are frightening and should concern all Americans about the state of our armed forces under President Obama.
The engine on one of the two Navy patrol craft was broken before it ever left port.
The crews had failed their most recent navigation exams. Several of the crew, including both captains, had either recently failed or not taken a required navigation exam and none of the crew had more than two hours of training on the navigation system.
Navigation is a sailor’s bread and butter. Not knowing navigation is tantamount to a hockey player not knowing how to skate.
The radios weren’t working. The two craft, Riverine Command Boats 802 and 805, left four hours late for their mission because they could not get their radios to work.
This speaks volumes about poor non-commissioned officers, aka chiefs, who obviously weren’t ensuring that the radios had proper maintenance or were replaced. One wonders what the officer in charge, Lieutenant David Nartker was doing instead of checking on his boats’ equipment.
None of the 10 sailors on either vessel had ever participated in a mission this long.
When the military spends all of its time on sensitivity training and other PC insanity, you lack time to conduct real training for war.
And when the chips were down the crews displayed a lack of “war-fighting toughness.”
As US Defense Watch has reported before, the US military is not focused on its mission, creating an organization that is internally feeble and projects weakness abroad.
Boat 805 never bothered to log their route.
No one looked at a paper map before departing, though it is required.
The crews had already voiced their concerns: they weren’t ready for this mission. It would be the longest mission they’d conducted, and would require a nighttime refueling – another thing that they’d never done.
Obviously, a real world mission in the Persian Gulf is a lot tougher than attending one of the military’s classes on why the Bible is a sexist document or conducting physical training with pregnancy simulators.
Things quickly went from SNAFU to TARFU to FUBAR as they drifted into Iranian waters.
At the critical moment when the navigation system identified Iran’s Farsi Island for them, none of the 10 picked up on that information because no one zoomed in on the island that the system was displaying. They also didn’t look at backup navigational charts on the boats or call in their location to one of their maritime operations centers.
The crews thought they would go around the island. But boat 802’s engine experienced a dangerous oil pressure drop, and cut speed. Boat 805 also dropped speed and came alongside.
Boat 802’s engine problems could have been fixed with the boat still moving, but the crew decided to stay put and fix the issue there. Despite the fact that they still had a visual on an unknown island and did not know their exactlocation, the boat captains did not have their gunners on watch to protect the craft while the repairs were under way.
They thought repairs would take 20 minutes. A few minutes later, they saw two small patrol craft approaching.
At 1,000 yards, the captain of boat 802 saw the incoming vessels had weapons. But he still did not tell his crews to take a defensive posture. He would later say he thought the vessels might have been friendly, from Saudi Arabia.
Obviously, when you don’t look at charts and fail navigation exams you have no idea if you’re in Baja or Beijing.
By the time the vessels were within 100 yards, the two U.S. boats manned theirguns.
Then they saw the blue flag of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The U.S. crews started yelling, trying to communicate by pointing to their wrench and engine that they were broken down. This wasn’t an incursion. By then, two additional Iranian vessels were headed toward them.
Lieutenant Nartker failed to order the crews to fire at least warning shots.
Instead, Nartker did order the boats to speed away. But by then it was too late, the Iranians were able to block their vessel and had their weapons fixed on boat. The crew’s coxswain saw the Iranian’s AK-47s were close enough for him to see they were pointed at his gunner. When the captain wanted another attempt to go, the coxswain said no.
“I tell the [boat 802] captain that we are not moving. [The boat 802 captain] said we just got to go and if they shoot through us then whatever. I am having this dumb conversation with him about how I am not going to drive. I am not going to get the [boat 802] gunner killed,” according to the investigation.
At that point, Nartker started negotiating with the Iranians.
“So at that point in time if I had decided to start a firefight, I know a lot of my guys would be dead. We might have all been dead at that point in time. I didn’t want to start a war with Iran, either … my thought at the end of the day was that no one had to die for a misunderstanding. And that, I guess, was a gamble on my part. I don’t want to say gamble because that is not exactly the right word, but in allowing us to be captured – that was my decision and my decision alone.”
Nartker’s cowardice immediately endangered his whole crew by delivering them into the hands of a nation led by psychopaths and religious zealots. He seemed more concerned about not harming Iranians than he was about doing his duty as a US Navy officer.
The crews raised their hands and kneeled. The boats were boarded. Once on board, the Iranians tore down the U.S. flags and replaced them with their own.
As they were filmed kneeling and bound, the female gunner on the crews activated the distress signal. The Iranians discovered her actions, and confiscated the device.
What the investigation found was that Nartker should have had his crew in a defensive posture while the downed vessel was getting repaired. It did not rule on his decision to surrender the boats to the Iranians, noting the Defense Department’s Code of Conduct does not clearly outline what actions an officer should take in regards to surrender if the situation occurs in non-armed conflict.
The Navy needs a reality check. While we are not in a declared war with Iran, they are the ENEMY, no matter what sick pill John Kerry tries to shove down the nation’s throat. The Code of Conduct clearly states how Nartker should have acted and he violated Articles II and V.
The investigation also found Natker acted honorably by directing the Iranians not to film his crew, but his filmed apology “was clearly inconsistent with the Code of Conduct.”
Nartker was in captivity for 15 hours and he submitted to making an apology. His acquiescence is worrisome. Does anyone in the Navy have any conception of how the Vietnam POW’s resisted North Vietnamese repeated attempts for them to make public apologies? Our POW’s in North Vietnam were routinely tortured for weeks or months until they broke and signed statements or agreed to be filmed.
Nartker’s excuse was that the Iranians threatened not to release him and his men if he didn’t make a formal apology on worldwide TV. So what? Tough it out trooper. You’re in the Navy, not an employee of Quaker Oats. Nartker gave in and the Iranians never even laid a hand on him or his men. They didn’t have to. They knew they were dealing with a gutless coward.
The report also found that the crew members improperly revealed passwords for laptops and cellphones and even sensitive technical details about their two ships, including their top speed, capabilities and missions, the report said. “It is clear that some, if not all, crew members provided at least some information to interrogators beyond name, rank, service number and date of birth,” the report said.
The Navy might want to replace some of their unconscious bias and white privilege training back to Code of Conduct classes.
In the aftermath, the Navy has recommended administrative actions against the task force commander and commodore, both of whom have already been carried out and both have been relieved of command. It has recommended its investigation be sent to each of the commands overseeing the executive officer directly responsible for the two boats, the captain of boat 805, and the coxswain of boat 805 who challenged the captain of boat 802’s decision to try to flee the Iranian vessels.
The investigation found that Nartker failed in many of the expectations that the Navy had of him. But the Navy also reported the lieutenant’s relative inexperience, low rank at the time and the extreme situation should be put in the context of the lack of oversight or mentorship his commanders had afforded him.
Wait a minute. David Nartker is a Lieutenant, not some green ensign with one week of active service under his belt. Nartker has been on active duty for several years. It’s his job to make tough decisions and to show courage. It’s also his job to look out for his crew. He failed at every task given to him.
Younger men than Nartker, with much less experience and without the prized Annapolis training have performed heroically throughout the history of the Navy. The Navy needs to stop making excuses for the poor conduct of its officers.
Lastly, the report found that the female gunner should “receive proper recognition for her extraordinary courage in activating the emergency beacon while kneeling, bound and guarded at Iranian gunpoint, at risk to her own safety.”
Apparently, the female gunner in Nartker’s crew was the only one who seemed to understand their duty and who exhibited courage.
The fallout from the incident has already resulted in the removal of the commodore and executive officer responsible for the vessels, Capt. Kyle Moses and Cmdr. Eric Rasch.
A third officer who was in charge of the detachment in Kuwait, who was not named, was also relieved of command, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson announced Thursday in a news briefing on the investigation findings.
The incident in the Persian Gulf last January should be a wake-up call for the US Navy. Not only were the sailors and officers in question lacking in training, they also had a desultory mentality toward maintenance of their equipment. When called upon to act courageously, they conducted themselves poorly and disgraced their service and their country while in captivity.
The US Navy has severe problems. This incident may have been isolated, but it speaks volumes about the declining readiness and warrior spirit in our military.
Should we be surprised? This is the type of military you get when the White House and the Pentagon are more focused on social engineering than training for war.
by Anthony Capaccio
The USS Gerald R. Ford — the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier and the costliest U.S. warship at $12.9 billion — won’t be delivered until at least November, more than two years late.
“During the ongoing testing of developmental systems” on the carrier built by Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., “first-of-class issues are continuing to be resolved,” according to a Navy statement provided Tuesday to Bloomberg News. “The current estimated delivery date is in November 2016. If additional issues arise during the remaining shipboard testing, that date may need to be revised.”
The service didn’t elaborate on the unresolved issues causing the delay except to say that testing is continuing for “the propulsion plant steam and electric systems,” which are powered by the carrier’s nuclear reactor. The latest schedule slip of at least two months may delay the Navy’s return to an 11-carrier fleet, the number mandated by Congress. The service has operated 10 carriers since the retirement of the USS Enterprise in 2012. Extended deployments of the remaining ships have placed stress on crews, the service has said.
Huntington fell 0.4 percent to $173.21 at 2:07 p.m. New York time.
The Navy didn’t say what impact, if any, the continuing testing issues and latest delivery delay will have on the vessel’s cost. The cost of the carrier, also known as CVN-78, is capped by law at $12.9 billion, under actions taken by Congress in 2006 and then modified in 2013 after the program’s cost had increased 22 percent since 2010. The Gerald Ford is the first of a three-carrier class estimated to cost $42 billion.
“This situation is unacceptable and was entirely preventable,” Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain said in an e-mail. “The Ford-class program is a case study in why our acquisition system must be reformed –- unrealistic business cases, poor cost estimates, new systems rushed to production, concurrent design and construction, and problems testing systems to demonstrate promised capability.”
“Even if everything goes according to the Navy’s plan, CVN-78 will be delivered with” unproven systems, such as the arresting system to snag planes as they land, said McCain, an Arizona Republican.
The Navy said Newport News, Virginia-based Huntington Ingalls is performing well as the shipbuilder. Many of the technologies installed on the first-of-class carrier are produced by other companies. As of last month, the ship’s construction is 98 percent complete, the Navy said. Huntington Ingalls has turned over 97 percent of the carrier’s compartments and 89 percent of shipboard testing has been completed, the Navy said.
The Navy originally said the Gerald Ford would be delivered in September 2014, then delayed that to September 2015. As that deadline neared, the Navy announced a “slight deterioration in the required progress” of shipboard testing that would delay delivery beyond March 31. Then, the Pentagon pegged delivery for this September in its annual “Selected Acquisition Report” on major weapons issued in March.
In the statement on the latest delay, the Navy cited “significant progress” with the electromagnetic system for launching aircraft, the multimission high-powered radar and the new deck system to catch landing aircraft, called “the advanced arresting gear.” It’s the same system the Pentagon’s inspector general criticized in an audit on July 8. The arresting gear is made by closely-held General Atomics based in San Diego.
“Ten years after the program entered” its engineering and manufacturing phase, “the Navy has not been able to prove the capability or safety of the system to a level that would permit actual testing” during deck landings “because of hardware failures and software challenges,” the inspector general said.
General Atomics spokeswoman Meghan Ehlke referred all comments on the inspector general’s audit to the Navy.
Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley said in written comments that he partially agreed with the inspector general and said the service was studying whether to retain existing systems on subsequent Ford-class carriers. At McCain’s insistence, funds for the arresting gear were limited in the fiscal 2017 budget until a formal review of the system is undertaken.
“The Navy concurs that the system is not yet ready to test on an aircraft carrier and that the technology was not sufficiently mature for use on CVN-78,” Stackley wrote.
By: Megan Eckstein July 6, 2016 9:13 AM
The Navy fleets have a $500-million ship maintenance budget shortfall leftover from last year that they cannot pay for on their own. Any existing budget slack is already stretched too tight – meaning that $500-million shortfall will likely be pushed into the next year, U.S. Fleet Forces Command officials told USNI News.
The Pentagon budgeting process forces Navy leaders to predict their spending needs two years out – and a lot can change in two years. Previously, though, there was enough margin in U.S. Fleet Forces’ other accounts – ship operations, air operations and combat operations – to help cover unexpected cost increases in the ship maintenance account. Now, USFF executive director and chief of staff Mark Honecker said, there is little to no slack in the fleet’s budget – so the combined $500-million shortfall in ship maintenance funding U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet faced at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2016 has barely shrunk, forcing the two organizations to search higher up the chain of command for money or continue the cycle of postponing maintenance work.
“What’s happened this year that made it a little more challenging is, we’ve gotten much better at pricing out our flying hours account, models have gotten better on the ship ops account, and so those margins that we had, they’re gone,” he said. “And so in previous years we would have been able to address these shortfalls and not defer these (maintenance) availabilities within our own account, but this year’s been a little bit different because we got better at models and then we also took a couple-hundred-million-dollar hit in our flying hour account. So those margins are gone now to solve our own problems.”
“Each year we do have a shortfall, each year we do manage the shortfall,” he continued, but “as budgets get tighter and margins go away, we’re unable to do that just within the fleet accounts, and we have to raise it up a few levels and see where we get resources elsewhere. But even Navy overall, there’s very limited resources and flexibility because there’s shortfalls in other accounts too.”
This year, it appears that without assistance from the Defense Department or Congress, Fleet Forces and PACFLEET will have to push that shortfall forward by deferring the maintenance availabilities of four surface ships and an attack submarine into FY 2017.
Rear Adm. Richard Berkey, U.S. Fleet Forces Command’s director of fleet maintenance, told USNI News that this fiscal year has played out very differently than the original plan called for. Planning for FY 2016 started in the fall of 2013, and several kinds of assumptions – on operational needs, the shipyard workforce, work package scopes and more – have proven wrong.
For starters, Fleet Forces and PACFLEET started the year at a combined $520 million in the hole in the ship maintenance accounts – $76 million and $444 million, respectively, Berkey said.
Fleet Forces’ shortfall was due to one simple event: the attack submarine USSMontpelier’s (SSN-765) interim dry docking period was moved from a public yard, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, to a private yard.
“[General Dynamics] Electric Boat won that contract, and when they won that contract their bid was $76 million higher than what we had anticipated,” Berkey said, noting that it wasn’t unusual for the private yard bid to be higher than the original government estimate. However, the contract was awarded after the program objective memorandum (POM) planning two years ahead of the start of the fiscal year, and also after the detailed budgeting process that starts one year out, creating a FY 2016 bill that wasn’t budgeted for.
The $444-million shortfall at PACFLEET, on the other hand, was much more complex.
- The biggest factor was that many availabilities took much longer than anticipated, not due to unexpected maintenance work but rather because modernization work suddenly started driving schedules. “Modernization, in the past, has generally not been a driver for schedule in availabilities – they would have been specific to particular parts of the ship, or particular machinery, or some capability like that. We’re now getting into modernization that really takes the ship apart completely,” Berkey said, citing the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) as an example. The scope and duration of a CANES installation is now well understood, he said, but “they didn’t know until between that budget process and the beginning of the year.”
- Additionally, three submarine availabilities were moved from public shipyards into private yards, which costs more. A fourth submarine was moved from the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard San Diego Detachment, which was more expensive but was necessary due to workforce imbalance issues, Berkey said.
- The Littoral Combat Ship class has proven more expensive to operate and maintain than was predicted a couple years ago, Berkey said. “I don’t think that’s a secret, that’s a new class of ship and we generally have that for every new class of ship. It’s a little bit more particular on the LCS because of the sustainment model that we have, where we minimize the manning on the LCS with the idea that we would sustain it from the shore with contractors and those types of things. We continue to mature that model and to understand what those real costs are going to be. So we’ve done that with the LCSs out of San Diego, and now moving them to Singapore adds a little bit of complexity to that that we’re still getting our arms wrapped around.”
- Workforce challenges at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility that “go back to the sequestration back in FY ‘13” led to delays in an availability for USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and pushed work from FY 2015 into 2016.
- And finally, three maintenance availabilities were intentionally moved from FY 2015 to 2016 to deal with a budget shortfall at the time.
Berkey said Fleet Forces ultimately shifted some of its money over to PACFLEET to help address all those challenges – though ultimately the shortfall is about the same size now as it was at the beginning of the fiscal year in October, with Fleet Forces facing a $330 million deficit and PACFLEET a $160 million deficit. That combined total equates to about 6 percent of the total ship maintenance budget for the two fleets.
That the deficit hasn’t shrunk much over the last nine months isn’t for lack of trying, though. Berkey said the Navy had begun awarding firm fixed-priced contracts for surface ships on the East Coast in FY 2016 instead of the old multi-ship/multi-option (MSMO) setup. Preliminary data shows that costs are coming down, freeing up money for the Navy to spend on other emerging ship maintenance work. Fleet Forces was also on track to save in FY 2016 due to the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) delivering in October instead of March 2016 and therefore pushing its selected restricted availability into FY 2017 – though that potentially creates a larger shortfall going into FY 2017.
However, the Navy will be facing a big unplanned bill this fiscal year when carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) returns home from a deployment that was not only extended a month but was also essentially the second in a back-to-back deployment with only bare-bones maintenance work in between.
“What we’re seeing now with the actual testing of equipment prior to the availability, the additional steaming time Truman has, we’re seeing a lot more work now coming into that package,” Berkey said.
“That availability will be much bigger than we anticipated, starting in September.”
So despite an effort to dig out of the funding shortfall, Fleet Forces and PACFLEET find themselves having to push that deficit into the next year – via deferring the five ship availabilities – unless the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense or Congress step in and find the money to pay for that work in this current year.
“We’re still hoping that money can come in, and the beauty of the contract strategy that we use is that if we get money in time we can put money back on contract using FY ‘16 funds, but if we don’t then that requirement then moves over into FY ’17,” Berkey said.
“And when we go into that year, similar to what I said about PACFLEET where they had three availabilities that went from ‘15 to ‘16, there will be five availabilities that move from ‘16 into ‘17 in aggregate between the two fleets.”
Asked if money was the limiting factor or if other reasons may preclude the Navy from carrying out those availabilities this year, Berkey said, “if we were resourced this year, we could award the contracts for those maintenance availabilities, if we got it early enough.
“If we got a check written to us tomorrow, we could award those contracts and not bow wave that work into ’17,” he continued.
“It is executable if resources are provided early enough.”
Budgeting In The Future
Berkey said there are two reasons to be optimistic that, even as planning for air operations and ship operations has gotten more accurate over the years, planning for ship maintenance will become more accurate too to avoid some of the problems PACFLEET saw going into this fiscal year.
First, the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) is already doing a better job of predicting the maintenance needs of specific ship hulls and should continue getting more accurate over the next few years.
SURFMEPP, which was stood up in 2010, has technical foundation papers that look at each class of ship and, based on where a hull is in its lifecycle and what type of maintenance availability it is approaching, outlines what type of work the ship is likely to need. SURFMEPP also maintains ship sheets for each individual hull, monitoring deferred maintenance and other things the engineering community knows about that particular warship.
Berkey said the Navy is about four years into using the technical foundation papers and ship sheets, so most of the ships have come in for an availability but not all have been in for a docking availability – which occurs every eight years or so. Once all the ships have been through a docking availability, where they are more thoroughly taken apart and inspected, SURFMEPP should have a very clear idea of the state of each ship and what to expect for future maintenance periods.
“I see the problem (of work package growth) reducing,” Berkey said, but “I don’t see it ever going away. There is always something that will surprise us when you take a pump off of a foundation that you couldn’t see before and then that foundation is eroding.”
The good news is that the Navy plans for 20-percent work growth when drafting the POM two years out, and they generally can stay within that margin.
“Where we see growth today is still on ships that have not gone through that process, that docking process that I was talking about before, and really getting into the tanks and understanding what those conditions are,” Berkey said, and within the next four or so years the Navy should have cycled all its ships through at least one docking period. He praised SURFMEPP as a “constantly improving process with the goal … to know exactly what the condition of the ship is so we can properly plan for it, order the material and be able to do the work on schedule and on time.”
A second positive for the future is that, after furloughs and hiring freezes in 2013, the workforce size has stabled out, though training continues to be a challenge.
“You can go back to the sequestration back in FY ‘13 where we stopped hiring for a while at the naval shipyards. We had pretty much recovered from the pure numbers of people we need back into the naval shipyards by the end of FY ‘15, but now there’s a training period,” Berkey said, noting that 20 percent of the shipyard workforce was hired within the last year and 50 percent within the last five years.
But the yards have created learning centers to help new hires become proficient at their trades faster, and Berkey said he was confident that cases of schedule delays and therefore cost increases due to workforce challenges – particularly like the case if Nimitz – will be less of a budgeting problem going forward.
REGISTRATION IS OPEN!!!!
Register now for the 2016 Tampa Bay Navy Ball Fishing FUNdraiser to be held 16 July 2016 from 0600-1600 (6AM-4PM) at Picnic Island Park, Tampa, FL.
In order to register, please send the following information via email to: USNavyBallFishingTournament@gmail.com
Team Name (if applicable):
Boat or Wading:
Cost: $30/per person (each angler pays)
Payable in person at Capt’s meeting or in advance via PayPal (send to: USNavyBallFishingTournament@gmail.com)
When: 0600-1600 (6AM-4PM); 16 July 2016
Captain’s Meeting: 15 July 2016 1700-2000 (5-8PM); Love’s Artifacts Bar and Grille (4918 S MacDill Ave, Tampa, FL 33611)
More details and registration can be found at:
Navy Ball Fishing Tourney Facebook page
Christopher P. Cavas, Defense News6:49 p.m. EDT June 28, 2016
WASHINGTON — The latest Russian-US kerfuffle at sea appears to feature a US warship making a close-in, high-speed pass on a Russian ship — but there may be more to the story than what a one-minute and two-second video shows.
The incident took place June 17 in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and involved the US destroyer Gravely and the Russian frigate Yaroslav Mudry.
In a video posted June 28 on YouTube by the Russian news agency Sputnik, the Gravely is seen coming up on the Mudry’s port, or left, side, on a roughly parallel course. The Gravely then appears to pick up even more speed and maneuver directly ahead of the Russian, pulling away and rocking the frigate with its wake.
“A US destroyer violated international and bilateral agreements by approaching a Russian ship dangerously close this month while it was following its course and didn’t violate any international law standards,” Sputnik wrote in the video’s description.
The Russian Defense Ministry, as reported by Sputnik, described the incident.
“US destroyer Gravely made a close encounter with a Russian warship in the eastern Mediterranean on June 17 at a distance of 60-70 meters [197-229 feet] on the port side and crossed the Yaroslav Mudry’s course along the bow at a dangerous distance of 180 meters [590 feet],” the ministry said.
The incident is the latest in an ongoing series of confrontational military encounters at sea and in the air, and takes place as the US has increased its naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean region.
For the first time in some years, two US Navy carrier strike groups were active at the same time in the Med. On June 2, the carrier Harry S. Truman — whose escorts included the Graveley — passed northbound through the Suez Canal and, on the following day, began combat strikes against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. The Truman apparently has wrapped up combat operations and was in port at Souda Bay, Crete last weekend. US officials on Tuesday would not confirm the ship’s location, but she is believed to be preparing to return to the US at the end of a seven-month deployment.
On June 13, the Dwight D. Eisenhower strike group entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar at the beginning of a scheduled deployment. After a visit to Naples, Italy, aircraft from the Eisenhower began flying combat strikes against ISIS earlier today.
A US defense official said there was more to the Gravely incident than just what was seen in the video on YouTube. The entire encounter, the official said, lasted more than an hour and took place entirely in international waters.
According to the official, the Gravely was escorting the Truman while the Russian frigate was observing operations and maneuvering too close for comfort to the carrier, restricting the flattop’s freedom of maneuver.
“Gravely was operating astern of Harry S. Truman, and assessed that 777 was intentionally trying to interfere with Harry S. Truman operations,” the official said, referring to the Russian frigate’s side number.
The destroyer maneuvered to place herself between the Yaroslav Mudry and the Truman, but the Russian closed to within 315 yards, the official said.
At that distance, “the interaction was assessed as unsafe,” the official said.
“The interaction was assessed as unprofessional because 777 displayed an international signal for being restricted in her ability maneuver, but then freely maneuvered in both course and speed as Gravely changed course and speed,” the US defense official said. “This demonstrates that 777 was not restricted in their ability to maneuver.”
The official provided a detailed description of the incident:
“777 had raised day shapes “ball-diamond-ball,” which is the international signal a ship displays when restricted in her ability to maneuver, when she took position two nautical miles off Gravely’s starboard quarter. Then, 777 repeatedly asked Gravely over VHF radio to maintain a safe distance, while 777 continued to maneuver to get closer to Gravely.
“As Gravely changed course and speed, 777 also changed course and speed. The maneuvering demonstrates that 777 was not in fact restricted in her ability to maneuver, and was thus intentionally displaying a false international signal.
“Gravely assessed that 777 was intentionally trying to interfere with Harry S. Truman operations.
“777’s closest point of approach (CPA) was approximately 315 yards to USS Gravely and five nautical miles to USS Harry S. Truman. The CPAs were closer than previous Russian Federation Navy interactions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea recently.”
That a maneuvering incident could grow into something more serious remains a danger, the official added.
“We have deep concerns about the unsafe and unprofessional Russian ship maneuvers,” said the US defense official. “These actions have the potential to unnecessarily escalate tensions between countries, and could result in a miscalculation or accident which results in serious injury or death.”
Earlier this month, the movement of the US destroyer Porter into the Black Sea on June 6 prompted an unusually high level of Russian protest. The US and a number of European navies regularly send ships into the inland sea, where low-level exercises with the navies of Ukraine, Romania and Turkey are the typical activities.
Several media outlets reported that the Russian government threated some sort of unspecified response to the Porter’s visit.
“American warships do enter the Black Sea now and then,” Andrey Kelin, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s European Cooperation Department, told RIA Novosti June 10, Russia Today reported. “Certainly, this does not meet with [Russia’s] approval and will undoubtedly lead to planning response measures.”
The Porter returned to the Mediterranean after 13 days in the Black Sea.
The Porter and Gravely are Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers displacing around 9,000 tons, able to hit speeds more than 32 knots.
The Yaroslav Mudry is a Project 1154 Neustrashimiy-class frigate displacing about 4,200 tons, with a speed of about 30 knots. The ship originally wore the side number 727, but appears to have recently changed to 777.
Gina Harkins, Marine Corps Times6:55 p.m. EDT June 27, 2016
Thousands of Marines serving throughout the infantry and in other key positions are about to get new gender-neutral job titles, but the service’s top leaders are pushing to leave the word “man” in some of its most iconic occupations.
In all, the Marine Corps plans to rename 19 of its military occupational specialties, or MOSs, as the result of a months-long review mandated by Navy Secretary Ray Mabus. A service-wide message announcing the changes is expected to be published within the next few days.
The terms “rifleman” and “mortarman,” are among those that remain untouched, according to a list — obtained by Marine Corps Times on Monday — of 33 MOSs that were reviewed. And that was by careful design, said a Marine official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
“Names that were not changed, like rifleman, are steeped in Marine Corps history and ethos,” the official said. “Things that were changed needed to be updated to align with other MOS names.”
In most cases, the word “man” will be replaced by Marine. Those changes are as follows:
- Basic infantry Marine.
- Riverine assault craft Marine.
- Light-armor vehicle Marine.
- Reconnaissance Marine (to include three other recon-related jobs that include the word “man”).
- Infantry assault Marine.
- Basic field artillery Marine.
- Field artillery fire control Marine.
- Field artillery sensor support Marine.
- Fire support Marine.
- Basic engineer, construction and equipment Marine.
- Basic tank and assault amphibious vehicle Marine.
- Armor Marine.
- Amphibious assault vehicle Marine.
- Amphibious combat vehicle Marine.
The field artillery operations man MOS is expected to be changed to field artillery operations chief, since that position is typically held by a Marine in the rank of staff sergeant or above.
The anti-tank missileman MOS is the only position that will pick up the word “gunner” in place of “man.”
Others on the list — like manpower officer or vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle specialist — will still include the word “man” because it’s part of a word that doesn’t describe the Marine doing the job.
In addition to the service-wide message that will address the changes, the Marine Corps plans to update its MOS manual, the official said. The full review included more than 33 MOSs, but many weren’t affected because they already include gender-neutral descriptors like “specialist” or “chief.”
Mabus directed the Marine Corps and Navy to review its job titles and descriptions in January, a month after Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced that all military jobs would open to women.
“As we achieve full integration of the force … this is an opportunity to update the position titles and descriptions themselves to demonstrate through this language that women are included in these MOSs,” Mabus wrote in a January order to Commandant Gen. Robert Neller. “Please review the position titles throughout the Marine Corps and ensure that they are gender-integrated as well, removing ‘man’ from the titles.”
The Navy’s review has broadened beyond its original mission of removing the word “man” from as many as 21 job titles and rating names. That review could ax newer titles like aircrew survival equipmentman, as well as timeless ones such as corpsman and yeoman — even seaman.
As of late June, no decisions had been made. The Navy has called for a second review of the proposals, a process likely to take a few months.
The move has proved unpopular with many Marines and sailors, with several branding it political correctness run amok.
“We have reached peak crazy,” one reader commented on an earlier story by Marine Corps Times about this topic.
“If a woman isn’t going to consider making the Navy her career because she is called a fireman or a corpsman, then I don’t think she was going to make the Navy a career period,” another reader commented on a Navy Times story. “We don’t need [people who are easily offended] like that clogging up the institutions that protect our country.”
Senior Reporter Mark D. Faram contributed to this report.
By Kris Osborn, Scout.com, 16 Jun 16
Next year, the Navy plans to use electromagnetic force to launch an F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet up into the sky off of the deck of its emerging next-generation aircraft carrier next year – the USS Gerald R. Ford.
An operational launch of the Navy’s Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, will mark the first time in 60-years that a fighter has shot off of a ship without using the current steam-catapult systems, senior Navy officials have said.
The first EMALS system has been under construction for several years aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford, or CVN 78, the first in class of the new carriers.
Ship integration and testing for the EMALS technology will mark a substantial milestone in a program which, until now, has largely been conducting deadload launches off of a ship and land-based flight tests at the Navy facility in Lakehurst, NJ.
Plans for the F/A-18 aboard the Ford come as Navy engineers complete testing and integration of the new electro-magnetic catapult aboard the Ford, Ensign Marc Rockwellpate told Scout Warrior in a statement.
“As part of this test phase, a total of 242 deadload launches were conducted. The EMALS system is now undergoing planned maintenance both aboard ship and at the land-based test site, in Lakehurst, New Jersey, in preparation for CVN 78 delivery. The first launches with FA-18E/F aircraft from CVN 78 are scheduled in FY17,” he said.
The EMALS system consists of a series of transformers and rectifiers designed to convert and store electrical power through a series of motor generators before brining power to the launch motors on the catapults, Navy officials have explained.
By having an electrical pulse come down, the aircraft is pulled down to the catapult to launch; the precise weight of the aircraft can be dialed in. As the aircraft accelerates the catapult, it can reach the precise speed it needs to launch, Senior Navy officials said.
Unlike steam catapults, which use pressurized steam, a launch valve and a piston to catapult aircraft, EMALS uses a precisely determined amount of electrical energy. As a result, EMALS is designed to more smoothly launch aircraft while reducing stress and wear and tear on the airframes themselves.
On the ship, EMALS will be engineered such that any of the ship’s four catapults will be able to draw power from any one of three energy storage groups on the ship, officials said.
As the catapult troughs for the USS Ford’s EMALS system were being built and integrated with the overall system, the system’s technology has been in the process of extensive testing at a Naval Air Warfare Center facility in Lakehurst, N.J.
The ground-based EMALS catapult tests have launched EA-18G Growlers, F/A-18 Super Hornets, C-2 Greyhound planes and E2D Advanced Hawkeyes, among others. In fact, EMALS even launched an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter at Lakehurst, Navy officials said.
The USS Ford has been under construction in recent years at Newport News Shipbuilding, a division of Huntington Ingalls. Equipment for the EMALS system has been in development on board the ship for several years, Navy officials said.
Some of the equipment, such as the motor-generators, are lower in the ship so they had to be part of the super-lift early on, service officials explained.
Metal decking is placed over the trough on the flight deck. Cabling and linear induction motor sections have been installed on board the USS Ford.
The linear motors are engineered to help create a sequentially activated rolling magnetic field or wave able to thrust or propel aircraft forward, Navy program officials explained.
Navy officials said It is the same type of technology used in a rollercoaster designed for critical launch reliability. An electromagnetic field turns on linear motor sequentially so as not to energize the whole field in one shot, Navy experts added.
The electromagnetic field acts on a large 22-foot long aluminum plate, he added. The aluminum plate runs in between stationary sections of 12-foot long linear motors. Electricity runs through the two sides of the motors, creating an electromagnetic wave.
Aircraft motors are kicked in and then a hydraulic piston pushes a shuttle forward. The shuttle is what connects to the aircraft launch bar, developers explained.
The EMALS system can adjust to different aircraft weights and configurations. For example, EMALS is configured such that it could launch a lighter weight aircraft, such as an unmanned aircraft system.
This is particularly useful because the amount of thrust needed to launch an aircraft depends upon a range of interwoven factors to include size, shape and weight of the aircraft, wind speed on the carrier deck and the speed of the aircraft carrier in the water, Navy program managers said.
EMALs is engineered to support current and future air-wing configurations; it is designed to accommodate a future air wing that requires higher energy launches.
The USS Ford is able to generate 13,800 volts of electrical power, more than three times the 4,160 volts that a Nimitz-class carrier generates, Navy engineers have explained.
The EMALS system is also engineered to work in tandem with the USS Ford’s new Advanced Arresting Gear, or AAG. Unlike the existing hydraulic system used on current aircraft carriers, AAG is a mechanical electrical system with a cable that spins a water twister.
Similar to EMALS, the AAG is also designed to reduce stress on the airframe during the landing process.
by SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on June 15, 2016 at 4:24 PM
The strangest-looking ship in the Navy is conducting two crucial tests. A broad, triple-hulled “trimaran” design likened to a villain’s vessel from Star Trek, theIndependence-class Littoral Combat Ship completed its Initial Operational Test & Evaluation on June 3rd. What’s more, the Navy Sea Systems Command announced yesterday, the USSCoronado (LCS 4) wrapped up IOT&E with its second successful test-firing of SeaRAM, a self-defense system designed to shoot down enemy drones and cruise missiles.
Just days later, sister ship USS Jackson (LCS 6) completed the first of three “full ship shock trials” June 10th, with live explosives going off underwater near the ship. Both shooting down incoming missiles and riding out explosions are critical capabilities for relatively small and inexpensive ships often derided as too fragile to take a hit.
So completing these tests is a significant step for the more obscure of the two LCS variants. The Independence ships have been overshadowed by the better-known Freedomclass. (The Freedom-class ship Fort Worth, LCS-3, completed IOT&E back in 2014). WhileFreedom-class LCS have conducteddeployments to Singapore — and suffered high-profile problems like hull cracks andbreakdowns at sea — the Independence ships have largely stuck to home waters, serving as test platforms for the minesweeping equipmentand other “mission modules” that will go on both types.
Indeed, it’s easy to forget that the Littoral Combat Ship is really two distinct designs, each making half of the production run. Odd-numbered ships, starting with LCS-1 Freedom, are built by Lockheed Martin and Wisconsin’s Marinette Marine. Their steel hull and aluminum superstructure that look like a conventional warship’s, albeit with touches inspired by an Italian racing yacht to help it reach high speeds. Even-numbered ships, starting with LCS-2Independence, are built at Austal’s Gulf Coast shipyard. Evolved from Australian high-speed ferries, they’re all-aluminum and they look weird.
“When that thing comes in port, everyone says, ‘What the hell is that?’” Work once said. “It looks like the Klingon Bird of Prey.”
Work has backed the LCS since his time as Navy undersecretary. Back then, he argued that the Navy needed to build both variants because of the different strengths of each design:
- The sporty Freedoms would be ideal for the tight confines of the Persian Gulf, Work said, where they could nimbly play cat-and-mouse with swarms of Iranian fast attack boats. The Freedom‘s traditional hull also makes it easy to launch and recover inflatable boats — for boarding actions or security sweeps — and unmanned craft off the stern ramp. Finally, Freedom‘s steel hull is also more damage-resistant than theIndependence‘s aluminum.
- The Independence is much higher off the water, so it must launch and recover subordinate craft with a crane, a much more awkward arrangement. But it’s also much broader, giving it a larger flight deck for helicopters and drones, plus more room for mission equipment, supplies, and fuel below. Work suggested these traits might make the trimarans better suited for the vast reaches of the Pacific.
Navy Secretary Ray Mabus has also insisted on buying both versions, although his argument has focused on cost. The rival shipyards slashed their prices when the Navy threatened to “downselect” to one, and as long as each yard knows it’s not the Navy’s only option, they’ll keep their bids low. While it’s more logistically efficient to maintain and supply a fleet of identical ships rather than multiple types, the Navy acknowledges, they’re buying so many LCS of each variant that they’ll still get economies of scale.
Both Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and his predecessor Chuck Hagel, however, have ordered the Navy to buy fewer Littoral Combat Ships and select just one shipyard to buildthe upgraded “frigate” version. So while both Austal and Marinette are preparing frigate designs, based on their existing ships, by 2019 the Navy will have to choose between the conventional hull and the Bird of Prey.
By Meghann Myers, Navy Times, 8 Jun 16
ABOARD THE CARRIER GEORGE WASHINGTON, OFF THE NORTH CAROLINA COAST – A year ago, the carrier Theodore Roosevelt took off for a nine-month deployment to the Middle East. Now, 1,700 members of its crew are back in Norfolk aboard this flattop, which came back from seven years in Japan in January, part of an unprecedented swap that sent TR to San Diego and the carrier Ronald Reagan to Japan.
It had been a very long year, crew members told Navy Times during a short underway in April, and many of them were looking forward to the down time as the carrier prepared to start its mid-life refueling in the fall. “From my standpoint, I try to be as hard-charging as possible when we’re operational,” Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) 3rd Class (SW/AW/IDW) Alejandro Lazo said. “Going into the yards, for the air department, is like a much-needed vacation.”
The three-carrier swap began in March 2015 with TR’s deployment from Norfolk to 5th Fleet. That summer, Reagan made the move from San Diego to Yokosuka, Japan, swapping much of their crews while the commanding officers stayed with the ships.
GW then headed to San Diego, where Roosevelt was completing its deployment and homeport shift to the West Coast. GW then swapped a chunk of its crew again, with TR, before heading down around South America and to Norfolk.
In the end, most sailors ended up staying in their original homeports, unless they volunteered to move or were due for new orders. The transition wasn’t necessarily welcome, Electrician’s Mate (Nuclear) 1st Class (SW) Justin Burk told Navy Times, who moved his wife to Norfolk before GW left Japan. “The deployment around South America was really long,” he said. “It was really hard throwing her to Virginia and having her on her own.” But he reports to electrician’s mate ‘A’ school to be an instructor in July, so he was due to come back stateside anyway, he added.
While sailors and their families are settling in, GW leadership is gearing up for the multi-year availability at Newport News Shipbuilding. “Our focus will shift from the warfighting mentality to maintenance,” training officer Lt. Cmdr. Shaina Hogan said. “Our ship is old. Let’s pause on the big mission and take care of her.” Hogan’s focus will be taking care of her sailors in the professional sense, making sure that they stay proficient in their jobs while they spend the next few years out of the deployment cycle. That includes sending some of them on temporary active duty to other ships to work on qualifications, she said, and if they can swing it, sending them on deployment.
“We also intend on letting a lot of sailors focus on college and other off-duty schools,” she said.
Staying on track – Many of the crew are preparing for their first experience in the yards, but some who transferred from TR are doing back-to-back periods, as that carrier came out of its refueling and complex overhaul in late 2013. “Coming back from the yards is kind of a difficult time, because you’re not doing your job for a long time,” said Master-at-Arms 2nd Class (SW) Nichole Lowery. “As far as this time, I already know what to expect.”
To keep the crew focused and out of trouble for the next few years, Command Master Chief (SW/AW/NAC/IDW) James Tocorzic said he’s focusing on “sailorization” programs – like sponsoring, petty officer associations and Coalition of Sailors Against Destructive Decisions – during his first experience with an overhaul. “We’ve got to find a way to keep people positively engaged in their professional and personal growth, and not to let that shipyard mentality – where they feel like they’re not part of the Navy – creep in,” he said.
Though leaders at every level are concentrating on keeping their sailors proficient, the other piece of getting through a yard period is keeping everyone out of trouble with more free time on their hands. That would be important for any transition, Tocorzic said, but he is particularly concerned because his crew has been through so much upheaval in the past year. “When you do a swap of this magnitude, those things are going to drop off,” he said. “We identify that. I know it’s taken place.”
The CMC is dealing with a mash-up of sailors, who are trying to meld the established workflow and routines from two carriers into one crew. “The legacy GW sailors – it’s probably more difficult for them, because they’re the stakeholders for George Washington, and then suddenly two-thirds of the people they know are gone,” he said. On the other side, the cohort of TR sailors checked in all at once. “For any sailor, when they PCS from one command to another, there’s an anxiety – there’s an unknown,” Tocorzic said. “So now you have to take that and multiply it by 1,700 sailors that came over with me from the Theodore Roosevelt.”
Rather than make them all go to their individual departments to check in, the command’s leadership tried to make things more personal and convenient. “We set it up with tables in the hangar bay, so the sailors who transferred over only have to make one stop,” he said, and at the end of check-in, Tocorzic and executive officer Capt. Kenneth Strong were there to shake sailors’ hands and give them their GW ball caps.
Tocorzic also took on GW’s CSADD program, which was top-rated. “It’s a group of sailors between 18 to 25 years old – which are the ones that always concerns me – not necessarily as a disciplinary thing, because those are the future leaders,” he said. His hope is that with enough mentorship and training opportunities, his sailors will stay busy and productive.
He also has a pet project, inspired by a recent data call that included answers from female sailors on why they choose to stay in or leave the Navy.
“I’m looking at trying to start something up with our female senior officers and enlisted,” he said. “I want to try to find a way – and this is all in my head right now – to show our junior female sailors that you can manage a family and be a professional sailor at the same time.” Statistically, women in the Navy get out at twice the rate of men, particularly before they reach senior ranks. The classic answer, Tocorzic said, is that they’re getting out to devote more time to their marriages and children, but he wants to encourage them to reconsider staying in. “You don’t have to stop that professional growth to go start a family,” he said. “You can do both.”